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Abstract
Since the bursting of Japan’s bubble economy, from 1990 onwards, Japanese multinational companies (MNCs) have faced new competitive challenges and questions about the management practices on which they had built their initial success in global markets. Japanese engagement in the international economy has undergone a number of phases. In the period before the Second World War, Japanese companies learnt from foreign MNCs in trading, shipping, and manufacturing, frequently through strategic alliances, and leveraged their capabilities to succeed in overseas and largely Asian markets. In the immediate post-war decades, during the Japanese ‘economic miracle’, there were notable examples of MNC investment in raw materials and labour intensive production, but both inward and outward foreign direct investment were not significant. Japanese companies achieved leadership in management and technology, in order to support a strategy of export-orientated industrialization. Changes in government policies in the developed economies of the US and Western Europe forced leading Japanese manufacturers to convert themselves into MNCs and to transfer their home-grown capabilities to overseas subsidiaries. The period after 1990 marked declining Japanese competitiveness and it asked questions about the ability of Japanese MNCs to be more responsive and global in their strategies, organization and capabilities.

Keywords: core capabilities, capability transfer, Japan, MNCs, subsidiary management

Introduction
Much of the writing on Japanese business has focused on its unique, national or culturally-determined characteristics. Yet, the influence of multinational enterprises or corporations
(MNCs) goes beyond Japan’s interaction with the international economy and their activities have shaped the strategies, capabilities and organization of Japanese business. From the 19th century onwards, alliances with foreign MNCs and the overseas operations of Japanese companies have been noteworthy in their impact. The story of the post-war ‘economic miracle’ (from 1950 to 1973) and the ‘lost decades’ (since 1990) are better known than the earlier periods of Japan’s engagement with the international economy. As the country recovered from the Second World War, licensing foreign technology and learning from leading foreign and notably US companies, Japan established a range of enterprises that exploited their particular combination of core capabilities through exports to overseas markets. Japanese levels of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) during the 1950s and 1960s were not significant, and the securing of raw materials to underpin industrialization at home and for the textile sector the attractions of cheaper labour in Asia were the principal motives; it was in the 1980s that these capital flows grew dramatically.

As is well known, capital and exchange controls had been formally lifted for some time before Japanese manufacturers decided to transform themselves, from the 1980s onwards, into MNCs, defined as owning or managing operating subsidiaries in foreign markets. Considering the timing of the surge in outward FDI, their motive was to overcome the imposition of tariffs and import quotas in the developed markets of the US and Western Europe, or, in other words, to protect the large export trade they had created. An additional reason was the rising value of the Yen, which favoured FDI over international strategies based on exports. As well as the strategies of individual companies, we have to account for the broader issues of international political economy to explain the motivations and strategies of Japanese MNCs. There are, too, matters of comparative economic development: post-war FDI followed the development of the Japanese economy and moved from the founding of overseas subsidiaries in light manufacturing to the building of an international presence in heavy industrial goods, complex machinery, consumer durables and automobiles. Japanese companies had achieved higher levels of managerial and technological capability in their home market. They were, as a result, able to make an impact outside Japan by boosting capital, output and jobs in host economies and, critically, by seeking to transfer their leading management methods and technologies to their subsidiaries. US and European businesses attempted, from the 1980s, to upgrade their failing competitiveness by adopting or adapting Japanese management methods. For a period, ‘globalization’, global ‘best practice’ and ‘Japanization’ all became synonymous.

As they established their presence in the developed markets of the US and Western Europe, Japanese MNCs showed an increasing bias towards wholly-owned overseas operations, and frequently, in manufacturing, towards ‘greenfield’ sites and developments. Perhaps the most famous example of this approach, Toyota, linked their preferred entry strategy in host markets to their ownership of highly competitive management and production methods that they sought, with success and adaptations, to transfer to subsidiaries (Toyota, 2012). Overseas plants that it owned or controlled facilitated the transfer of methods and protected proprietary knowledge and technology. This model of MNC strategy and organization was marked by high levels of managerial centralization, strong cross-border control by the parent enterprise and marked reliance on the know-how, technologies and senior personnel of the main business in Japan. To assist in the maintenance of MNC parent control and in the overseas installation of home country practices, Japanese companies relied extensively on the sending of expatriate engineers and managers to their subsidiaries.

Once Japanese MNCs had met their initial strategic motivations for overseas investments in developed economies (to secure export markets), it followed that they would have to consider the next stage of subsidiary development. To be more competitive and more responsive to national or regional markets, the enhancement of local capabilities would gain priority and centralized, cross-border control would consequently have to recede in favour of subsidiary level decision-making in product development, research, or employment policies. By the mid-1990s, Japanese business practices seemed no longer able to provide the means of sustaining and improving competitiveness. The top-down parent-subsidiary relationship did not facilitate the ability to absorb lessons in managerial practices from overseas markets, unlike flatter federative structures, in which capabilities were not concentrated in Japan but spread more evenly throughout the MNC. Slow or negative growth rates in Japan emphasized the search for growth in overseas markets and made the case for subsidiaries having an enhanced role in relation to the parent business. From the 1990s, Japanese MNCs had to give increased consideration to FDI strategies of efficiency seeking (in overseas R&D networks, or through access to lower production or labour costs) and asset seeking (acquiring foreign firms and attempting to utilize their capabilities).

Three questions arise from the post-1990 period, following the bursting of the Japanese ‘bubble’, which exposed weaknesses in business practices and ended decades of rapid growth. First, how different were the strategies and organization of Japanese MNCs in the post-bubble period to those utilized previously? Second, in what ways did the strategies and organization of Japanese MNCs change after 1990? Third, how effective were Japanese MNCs in responding to new competitive challenges and evolving new or improved capabilities? We address these questions next.

The Long-View: Japan and the Multinational before 1950
The role of MNCs in the Japanese economy before 1950 underwent three phases: 1875-1914, 1914-1937 and 1937-1950. From 1875 to 1914, and through their interactions with foreign businesses, Japanese trading and shipping firms increasingly established themselves overseas, and many of them built their success on the expansion of Japan’s leading industry at the time, cotton textiles. From 1914 to 1937, the Japanese industrial base broadened and the examples of notable FDI by foreign firms in Japan increased, speeding the transfer of managerial and technological know-how. As in the case of trading companies, Japanese manufacturers showed a strategic pattern of leveraging lessons from foreign MNCs and exploiting their own growing capabilities in Asia and in its colonies. Another pattern was the active involvement of government in protecting the emergence of Japanese businesses and in assisting their evolution in international markets. The strains created by worldwide economic depression after 1929 and international criticism of Japanese policy in Manchuria from 1931, began to turn the government against inward FDI. With the invasion of China in 1937, nationalist-militarist policies were confirmed, and the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 brought Japan into the Second World War (Fitzgerald, 2014).

As soon as the US had forced open Japanese ports to trade, in 1858, foreign trading firms and banks began to exploit the new opportunities given to them: amongst the many firms that came to Japan were the British-owned Jardine Matheson, and Adamson, Bell, plus the Hongkong Bank (the forerunner to HSBC); Walsh, Hall, from the US; Germany’s E.Fischer & Co. and Deutsche-Asiatische Bank (part of Deutsche Bank); and the Banque Franco-Japonaise, a joint venture. Thomas Blake Glover arrived as a Jardine Matheson representative and stayed to find his own trading house. He enabled the ‘Choshu Five’, some of whom would come to dominate politics in Meiji Japan, to tour and learn from the West. Glover supplied armaments to the Choshu and Satsuma clans of South West Japan, whose intervention in the Meiji Restoration of 1868 was pivotal. Amongst his commercial activities, Glover’s dealings with what became the Mitsubishi conglomerate (then one of Japan’s newest but fastest expanding zaibatsu) fundamentally shaped that business and especially its trading entity (the origins of the modern Mitsubishi Corporation).

In reforming its economy and staving off colonization XE "imperialism" , the first commercial aim of the government XE "government"  was not industrialization XE "industrialization"  but taking control of its trade XE "trade" , dominated by foreign merchants XE "trade"  and shipping XE "shipping"  lines. From 1875, the government XE "government"  sought to establish its own trading XE "trade"  firms, assisting them through the founding of the Tokyo Marine Insurance Company (in 1879) and the Yokohama Specie Bank (1880), which provided exchange and credit. Leading general trading XE "trade"  companies XE "trading companies"  (sogoshosha) were often arms of business conglomerates (zaibatsu) and government XE "government"  sponsorship and contacts were central to their growth and success (a model that would be replicated in Korea, with their general trading companies and chaebol. See Jun and Rowley, 2014). European and especially British trading companies were commercially powerful in Asia and active participants in the spread of imperialism in the region. They and US companies also served as business models for Japanese trading houses. The sogoshosha developed and provided the overseas expertise and knowledge other parts of Japanese XE "Japan"  business lacked and by dealing in many products and acting for many clients, their scale became a source of advantage against international competitors that remained at this point more experienced and better connected. By 1911, Japan directly controlled 51 per cent of its exports and 64 per cent of its imports XE "imports"  (Fitzgerald, 2014; Kawabe, 1989).

Mitsui XE "Mitsui"  Bussan, from 1876, challenged Walsh, Hall for the rice XE "rice"  trade XE "trade" , although to achieve its aims it had to rely on the cooperation of another foreign trader XE "trading companies" , E. B. Watson (Kawabe, 1987). It had links with Carnegie Steel, the American XE "United States"  Locomotive Company and the world leader in cotton XE "cotton"  textile machinery, Britain XE "Britain" ’s Platt Brothers, and it founded cotton spinning enterprises and flour milling in Shanghai. With the help of R.W.Irwin, Mitsui Bussan established a New York office in order to organise its valuable silk exports and it worked with the London-based Ralli Brothers in India. By 1908, it had representative offices throughout Asia XE "Asia"  (especially in China XE "China" ), Siberia, the US XE "United States" , Australia XE "Australia"  and Germany XE "Germany" . Like other Japanese XE "Japan"  traders XE "trading companies" , it was instrumental to the economic development XE "economic development"  and integration of Japan’s own colonies XE "imperialism"  through their investments in natural resources and manufacturing XE "natural resources" . Sugar plantations in Taiwan ranked amongst the largest joint stock businesses in Japan (Suzuki, 1990). After the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05, Japan forcibly took possession of the Liaotong Peninsula (containing Dalian and Port Arthur), where it established the South Manchuria Railway, which depended heavily at the time on the trade XE "trade"  in soy XE "soy"  beans and products (Patrikeff and Shukman, 2007; Allen and Donnithorne, 1954; Fitzgerald, 2014).
By 1899 and as soon as the Japanese government had permitted inward FDI, the American XE "United States"  Bell Telephone Company’s manufacturing XE "manufacturing"  subsidiary XE "subsidiaries, multinational" , Western XE "West, the"  Electric, bought a controlling interest in Nippon Electric Company (today’s NEC). Western Electric had the guarantee of government orders given to NEC and it was required to fulfil a national project to connect the Japanese archipelago and to facilitate imperial expansion into Korea and Manchuria through long-distance telephone communications. Western Electric brought its technology and production methods and supervised the training of managers, supervisors and engineers. General Electric of America, by 1910, was a major shareholder in the Tokyo Electric Company (Tokyo Denki) and in the Shibaura Engineering Works (Shibaura Seisakusho), in alliance with Mitsui XE "Mitsui"  Bank (Shibaura later acquired the name of Toshiba). The well-known engineering firm of Armstrong Whitworth assisted the establishment of shipyards. One early example of outward FDI, from 1916 to 1918, was the South Manchurian Railway establishing the Anshan Iron and Steel Works, which became part of an industrial XE "industry"  complex making ceramics, oil XE "oil" , fats, flour XE "flour" , sugar XE "sugar" , chemicals, shale oil and electricity XE "electricity" . In the inter-period Japan maintained or reaffirmed its openness to inward FDI XE "foreign direct investment" , but, as an industrializing country, its government XE "government"  used import licensing XE "licensing" , tariffs XE "tariffs"  and quotas to foster domestic manufacturing XE "manufacturing" . It especially encouraged joint ventures XE "joint ventures"  with foreign investors in the expectation that they would promote the transfer of technology and management XE "management" . In 1923, Siemens XE "Siemens"  & Halske (now simply Siemens) founded Fuji Denki Seizo, in later years simply Fuji Electric, in association with Furukawa Electric, itself part of a large zaibatsu. Fuji’s Kawazaki factory became a classic example of transferred technological XE "technology"  and managerial XE "management"  capabilities (Kudo, 1994; Udagawa, 1990; Fitzgerald, 2014; Wray, 1984; Mason, 1990).

Mitsubishi Electric was incorporated during 1921 with the US MNC, Westinghouse, as a shareholder. On the back of a government XE "government"  commission and using broadcasting equipment made by its US XE "United States"  partner, NEC introduced radio to Japan XE "Japan"  between 1924 and 1930. The companies that made up Germany’s I.G.Farben had a central role in the emergence of the Japanese chemical industry from the late 1920s onwards. With the invasion of Manchuria and Japan’s decision to leave the League of Nations, an increasingly nationalist-militarist government sought to reduce the influence of overseas capital XE "capital" . Western Electric had sold its interest to International Standard Electric (ISE) - a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) - and the Japanese government forced ISE to increase the shares controlled by the Sumitomo zaibatsu. Legislation forced Ford and General Motors to withdraw from their cooperation with Toyota and Nissan motors, which in any case turned their attention to producing military trucks. During the Second World War, the various trading enterprises, banks, NEC and the Nissan new zaibatsu acquired large interests throughout Japan’s colonies and occupied territories (Kudo, 1994; Fitzgerald, 2014; Mason, 1987; Mason, 1990).

Post-War Economic ‘Miracle’ and Multinational Business
The history of Japan and MNCs in the post-war period is divided by a fundamental watershed. Under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law of 1949 and the Foreign Investment Control Law of 1950, inward and outward flows of FDI were not possible without official approval and both became strictly limited. Exceptions were investments overseas in raw materials and supplies, often led by trading companies, since these were needed to further industrialization and economic growth at home. Investments in essential manufacturing components or in components used for re-export in finished products were accepted. With rising production and labour costs in Japan, textiles firms could relocate, largely in East Asia and they received tax assistance and subsidies to assist their transformation (Solis, 2003). From 1980 onwards, some ten years after the relaxation of overseas investment and currency regulations, large Japanese manufactures led the dramatic surge in outward FDI. The ownership advantages and core capabilities that enabled Japanese companies to become successful MNCs were built during the earlier period of rapid growth. By the 1980s, Japanese companies were perceived as having acquired and developed superior managerial methods (Dore, 1973; Vogel, 1979; Thurow, 1983).

In the post-war era and critically from the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the US actively sought to build Japan as a Cold War ally in a turbulent region of the world. After years of experimentation, Fujitsu produced Japan’s first commercial XE "commerce"  computer, but the Japanese XE "Japan"  government realized that, to avoid falling further and further behind in the international technology race, it would need access to US XE "United States"  patents. In 1961, Fujitsu made an agreement with IBM, in return for the government allowing the US XE "United States"  company to manufacture XE "industry"  locally, as IBM Japan. In parallel, Japan restricted imports XE "imports" , subsidized native producers and curtailed needless competition in the interests of stimulating innovation in computing XE "innovation" . After a period, the government XE "government"  forced Fujitsu to devote itself to mainframes and integrated circuits. Product successes were forthcoming, but could not match those of IBM Japan XE "Japan" . The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) decided to reorganize the nation XE "nation state" ’s computing sector and paired Fujitsu with the computing division of a major rival, Hitachi. In 1972, a small investment XE "investment"  in the US XE "United States" ’s Amdahl Corporation, founded by an ex-IBM engineer, gave access to the new firm’s technological XE "technology"  insights and Fujitsu traded limitless capital XE "capital"  from the Japanese XE "Japan"  government and the captive sales XE "marketing"  market of NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone). The Fujitsu-Hitachi M-series was the result and by 1980 it was outselling IBM in the Japanese XE "Japan"  home market XE "home nation" , if not in overseas markets.

For policy-makers, the Fujitsu-IBM story was a clear case of how engagement in the international economy could be combined with government XE "government" -led industrial XE "industry"  strategy if a developing country wanted to close the gap with global leaders rather than just exposing itself to advanced competition. Once its economic miracle was under way and Japan XE "Japan"  had joined the group of developed countries, it was another logical destination for overseas manufacturing XE "manufacturing"  investment XE "investment" . Yet, the government maintained regulations curtailing imports XE "imports"  and legislation forbade outward and inward FDI XE "foreign direct investment"  with the aim of keeping all capital XE "capital"  for the industrialization XE "industrialization"  of the Japanese XE "Japan"  home economy XE "home economy"  by Japanese XE "Japan"  companies (Fizgerald, 2014).

For the US XE "United States"  administration that ruled Japan XE "Japan"  after 1945, the family-owned zaibatsu conglomerates had been part of the nationalist military XE "military"  regime that had provoked war in the Pacific XE "Pacific Ocean" . It was determined to replace the controlling families and it ended the economic power of the conglomerates by breaking them up into unconnected companies. The Japanese XE "Japan"  government XE "government"  from 1949 began to ease such anti-monopoly regulations and went further with the relaxation of rules after the Korean War, deeming business groups XE "business groups"  as important to its post-war policy objectives. Former zaibatsu reconvened after 1954 as kigyo shudan (often called, mistakenly, kigyo keiretsu), this time looser groupings of independent businesses with their own professional managers XE "management" ; other major kigyo shudan coalesced around major banks XE "banking" . By pooling capital XE "capital"  and spreading commercial XE "commerce"  risks, they could assist bold plans in investment XE "investment"  and labour power, as made by MITI, to bring about Japan’s rapid industrialization XE "industrialization" . As well as being suspicious of the zaibatsu, the US administration had objected to the size and reach of the sogoshosha. It split them up, in 1947: Mitsui XE "Mitsui"  Bussan ended up as 233 separate enterprises, Mitsubishi XE "Mitsubishi"  Shoji as 139. From 1950, the Japanese government allowed them to re-group, with Mitsubishi Shoji being re-established in 1950 and Mitsui & Co. likewise in 1958. In the 1960s and amongst many varied activities, including the procurement of technology and raw materials for the home economy, Mitsui & Co. was active in copper XE "copper"  mining XE "mining"  in Mexico XE "Mexico" , Chile XE "Chile" , Canada XE "Canada"  and Australia XE "Australia" , and from 1971 it allied with three Japanese XE "Japan"  chemical firms and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to form the Iran Japan Petroleum Company. Mitsubishi Shoji worked on LNG production with Royal Dutch Shell, operated iron-ore and coal mines in Canada and Australia and marketed Mitsubishi cars in alliance with Chrysler in the US. It re-incorporated itself as Mitsubishi Corporation in 1971 (Fitzgerald, 2014).

Japanese XE "Japan"  government XE "government"  initiatives and subsidies from 1947 and throughout the 1950s were essential to creating both the shipbuilding and shipping industries, assisting the XE "shipbuilding"  securing of raw materials XE "raw materials" , technology XE "technology"  and equipment and supporting the official strategy of export XE "exports" -orientated industrialization XE "industrialization" . Tokyo Automobile Industries Company became known as Izusu, in 1949. Under licence from the Rootes Group from 1953, the company made the Hillman Minx and from 1961 it produced its own car, the Bellel. In 1971, Izusu signed a deal with General Motors, which took 34 per cent of its shares and the flow in design and product development XE "product development"  went in both directions. The Izusu Faster inspired the Chevrolet LUV or pick-up truck, which appeared first in 1972, in the US XE "United States"  and later in Latin America XE "Latin America" ; the Kadett, made by GM’s German subsidiary, Opel, transmuted into Izusu’s Gemini, launched in 1974, and into Buick’s Opel, for the US XE "United States"  market. Japanese XE "Japan"  kaisha created the leadership in management XE "management" , products and technology XE "technology"  (often combining low price and rising quality) that could be a foundation for future MNC investment XE "investment" . Fujitsu Fanuc (Fuji Automatic Numerical Control) – a wholly owned subsidiary XE "subsidiaries, multinational"  of Fujitsu spun-off as a separate enterprise in 1972 – dominated the factory automation business in Japan. In1975, it licensed its technology to Pratt and Whitney, the US XE "United States"  aerospace engineering XE "engineering"  company and to Siemens XE "Siemens" , which also took a shareholding in the Japanese XE "Japan"  firm XE "industry" . Furukawa Aluminium Company – founded in 1959 with technical assistance from Alcoa – built two plants in Romania during 1966 (Fitzgerald, 2014).

We know, furthermore, that the engineering XE "engineering"  conglomerate Hitachi Zosen established a chemical fertilizer XE "fertilizer"  plant for the Gujarat State Fertilised Company of India XE "India"  in 1957, in a record 33 months. The construction XE "construction"  company, Kajima – with its expertise in earthquake technologies XE "technology"  – took up the challenges of overseas projects throughout Asia XE "Asia"  in the 1960s, before, in the decade that followed, undertaking major and diplomatically sensitive contracts in East Berlin XE "Berlin"  and entering the US XE "United States" . Japan XE "Japan" ’s rapid industrialization XE "industrialization"  and urbanization XE "urbanization"  created construction and engineering companies with experience of managing large projects. While preferring for the time being to export XE "exports"  to the developed markets of Western XE "West, the"  Europe XE "Europe"  and North XE "North, J.T."  America XE "North America" , where it set up sales XE "marketing"  offices, Toyota did establish its first overseas operation, in 1958, an assembly plant in Brazil and then two more in South Africa XE "Africa"  in 1964 and Ghana in 1969, in part as responses to government pressure. Fuller FDI XE "foreign direct investment"  strategies XE "business strategy"  followed some examples of MNC apprenticeship, encouraged by the rising value of the yen and by the relaxing of government XE "government"  controls on outward flows of capital XE "capital"  in 1971 (Interview, Toyota executives, January 2012). Nippon Seiko – adopting a strategy of providing enhanced customer service XE "services"  in its export XE "exports"  markets XE "markets"  – founded its first overseas factory in Sao Paolo in 1970, another in Michigan in 1973 and one in Peterlee, Scotland in 1976. Japan XE "Japan" ’s second largest bearing maker, NTN Corporation, was similarly manufacturing XE "manufacturing"  in the US XE "United States"  and additionally in Canada XE "Canada"  and Germany XE "Germany"  by 1980. Sony – building its reputation in the electronics industry XE "industry"  as an innovator – opened its first US XE "United States"  plant in 1971 and another in South Wales in the UK XE "United Kingdom"  by 1974 (Fitzgerald, 2014; Mason and Encarnation, 1994).

Outward FDI Surge and Capability Transfer
The take-off in Japanese XE "Japan"  FDI XE "foreign direct investment"  and, therefore, in Japanese XE "Japan"  manufacturing FDI XE "foreign direct investment"  occurred during the 1980s, when governments XE "government"  in the US XE "United States"  and Western XE "West, the"  European XE "Europe"  governments XE "government"  imposed quotas and tariffs XE "tariffs"  that threatened the overseas markets so successfully won through exports XE "exports" . Therefore, before the take-off, some 66 per cent of Japanese XE "Japan"  FDI XE "foreign direct investment"  could be found in developing countries, against 27 per cent by US XE "United States"  MNCs and 20 per cent by those from Britain XE "Britain"  (Kojima, 1978). By 1970, outward Japanese FDI was only significant in mining, timber, pulp and textiles and by 1975 Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsui & Co., Marubeni and C.Itoh accounted for 40 per cent of outward FDI stocks (Ozawa, 1979). In 1977, Japan provided approximately 6 per cent of total global FDI flow and at its peak in 1989 it was the largest provider with 30 per cent. Japanese FDI flow amounted to $4,693 million in 1980, with manufacturing composing 36 per cent of this total; in 1989, the figures were $67,540 million and 24 per cent. By 1988, Japan had overtaken the European XE "Europe"  Community and the US XE "United States"  as the largest supplier of outward FDI XE "foreign direct investment"  flows. In 1980, some 34 per cent of FDI flows from Japan went to North America, 12 per cent to Europe and 25 per cent to Asia; by 1989, the figures were 50, 22 and 12 per cent respectively, witnessing the new determination of Japanese MNCs to invest in North America and Europe and less in Asia (UNCTAD, 1994; UNCTAD, 1998; Fitzgerald, 2014).

As we have noted, the capabilities owned by Japanese MNCs accounts for the success of their overseas operations but do not explain their strategic motivation for establishing foreign subsidiaries. The rising value of the Yen undermined the policies of export-orientated industrialization and changes in the structures of international political economy were determinant. Japan had abided by Voluntary Export Restrictions, as early as 1957 in cotton goods, followed by others in steel in 1969 and in woollens and colour televisions in the 1970s. Britain limited Japanese automobile imports from 1975. From 1981, the US began to impose import restrictions in automobiles and machine tools and the European Economic Community began a range of controls from 1986 onwards (Farrell, 2008).

From the 1980s, outward FDI was led by the automobile and electrical-electronic sectors. They, and the general trading enterprises, featured amongst the largest of Japan’s MNCs. Toyota, Sony and Panasonic became important MNCs, as well as owners of international brands XE "brands" . Moreover, new Japanese XE "Japan"  manufacturing XE "manufacturing"  affiliates overseas brought with them the management XE "management"  and production XE "management"  techniques that had made them such highly successful exporters and Western XE "West, the"  firms tried to restore their dwindling competitive position by imitating them (with mixed results). Their methods had acquired the reputation of global ‘best practice’. Japan was home to eight of the top 50 non-financial XE "finance"  MNCs, as ranked by assets, in 1992, seven in manufacturing, one in trading XE "trade" ; it could claim eight manufacturers XE "industry"  and six trading XE "trade"  companies XE "trading companies"  in the top 100 by 1998, although some sliding down the table rankings by individual companies was an early hint that their comparative competitiveness had already peaked (Rugman and Brewer, 2001; UNCTAD, 1998).

During the post-war decades, Toyota had developed home-based ‘ownership advantages’ in management and production systems, human resource management and distribution, and an expertise in R&D. Its FDI policy rested on setting up overseas plants rested on a desire to transfer the internationally acclaimed ‘Toyota Way’, led by the parent business in Japan. The company began production in the US from 1983 and in Britain by 1992 (Toyota, 2012). From 1988, Sanyo began manufacturing in the US and in Europe (Panasonic-Sanyo, 2010). Sony Corporation’s acquisition of Columbia Pictures was both an investment opportunity and a chance to diversify by product range and geographically. There were acquisitions as well as greenfield developments, as instanced by Bridgestone’s acquisition of Firestone, which made it an international leader in the industry. In Europe, some Japanese companies quickly founded regional enterprises. Panasonic Europe was established in 1988 and Toyota had a European headquarters from 1990. In 1998, Toyota launched the Yaris, the first car it designed in and for the European market. Despite, however, acknowledgement of the need to develop managerial and product development capabilities in overseas subsidiaries, Japanese MNCs generally retained their reputation for being tightly controlled from Japan and by Japanese management (Ando, 2004; Mason and Encarnation, 1994; Abo, 1994; Kenney and Florida, 1993).

The Post-Bubble Challenge for Japanese MNCs
From 1990, the Japanese economy entered its years of low and even negative growth; as the internationally praised success story came to an end, the identification of Japanese management methods with global ‘best practice’ similarly ended. The difficulties that Japan faced raised questions about the efficacy of imitating Japanese firms and of Japanese MNCs transferring their capabilities to their subsidiaries. When economic growth did not return, as might have been expected, it suggested that the Japanese political and business systems needed reform and forced Japanese companies to re-assess their competitiveness and core capabilities (Schaede, 2008). Japanese MNCs have had to tackle the problems of poor growth rates in their home economy. This deteriorating economic performance occurred, moreover, during years in which the pace and nature of internationalization or globalization increased significantly.

The surge in global FDI was especially noteworthy, as were the unprecedented expansion of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A); the off-shoring of production to locations of low costs and wages; a greater tendency towards FDI strategies of efficiency-seeking and asset-seeking; the forging of cross-border, vertical production or value chains; a rise in the use of strategic alliances and the contracting out of production and key activities; the redirection of FDI to developing countries and ultimately the arrival of ‘dragon multinationals’ or developing economy MNCs; the growth in service FDI relative to manufacturing and resource extraction; and a tendency towards federative, flatter MNC organisation and the enhancement of subsidiary capabilities, instead of the hierarchical and established parent-subsidiary relationship (Fitzgerald, 2014). While the international competitiveness of Japanese MNCs was adversely affected by the prolonged economic slowdown of their home economy, their continued preference for established strategies, organisation and capabilities has impaired their adaptation to changes in global markets (Black and Morrison, 2012; Collinson and Rugman, 2008; Itagaki, 2009; Marukawa, 2009; Numagami, Karube and Kato, 2010). The continued reliance on the knowledge and experience of home country personnel has been a block on such a transformation and inhibited the development of overseas subsidiaries and host country personnel (Black and Morrison, 2012; Collinson and Wilson, 2006; Byun and Ybema, 2005; Hong and Snell, 2008; Hong, Snell and Easterby-Smith, 2006; Beechler and Bird, 1999; Busser, 2008; Lam, 2003; Marukawa, 2009). 

The end of Japan XE "Japan" ’s fast growth era from 1990 hurt general traders XE "trading companies"  whose fortunes were tied to the country’s import-export XE "exports"  trade. With little scope for growth at home, the sogoshosha needed to foster business worldwide and they abandoned their traditions of a fully-comprehensive service XE "services"  and maximum sales XE "marketing"  for the profit-testing of every commercial XE "commerce"  activity. They became more involved in business solutions, consultancy, project management XE "management" , IT, communications, venture capital XE "capital" , investments XE "investment"  and technology XE "technology"  acquisition, as well as logistics and chain management. Four sogoshosha could be found, moreover, in the list of the world’s top 100 non-financial XE "finance"  MNCs for 2008, measured by overseas assets, with Mitsubishi the largest in 32nd place, followed by Mitsui & Co., Sumitomo Corporation and Marubeni.

As the growth of Japanese manufacturing MNCs slowed, service sectors outside trading found it difficult to build an overseas presence (UNCTAD, 2008).  Japan’s ‘Big Bang’, in 1994–97, initiated a series of mergers leading to the emergence of ‘mega-banks XE "banking" ’ better able to compete globally, including the Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi, in 1996, which through a succession of further amalgamations created Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, in 2005, as the world’s largest bank XE "banking"  by assets. Yet, overall, Japanese banks did not evolve into globally competitive MNCs. Japanese XE "Japan"  retailers – Seven & I Holdings, owner of Ito-Yokada, and Aeon – expanded within Asia XE "Asia" , but remained highly reliant on their home market XE "home nation" . The most impressive entrant was Uniqlo, which took GAP as its model and shared Zara’s mix of good design, high quality, low price and fast logistics. The company opened its first store in Tokyo in 1984, going international in London and Shanghai XE "Shanghai"  by 2002 and operating in 10 overseas countries by 2012 (Fitzgerald, 2014).

Japanese manufacturers had traditionally favoured greenfield developments, but, as asset seeking became a more common MNC strategy, they too adapted.  Asahi Glass bought Pilkington for its proprietorial knowledge and market access; Toshiba bought Westinghouse for its patents and technology in nuclear energy; Japan Tobacco bought UK Gallagher for its brands and market presence; and Takeda too gained market access, patents and R&D. Asset seeking enabled Japanese firms to expand quickly as MNCs and to obtain capabilities they did not possess. Nonetheless, while Toyota and Honda retained international competitiveness, other automobile enterprises such as Nissan came under the control of foreign MNCs. Japanese MNCs had succeeded through faith in their home-grown capabilities, strong parental or HQ control and the transfer of capabilities to its subsidiaries. By the end of the 1990s, Japanese business practices seemed no longer able to provide the means of sustaining and improving competitiveness and top-down parent-subsidiary relationships appeared less appropriate. The growth of global production chains and contracted production; the need to empower subsidiaries in faster growing markets and the consequent advantages of federated MNC organisation and the gains from more open organisational structures that could absorb lessons from global competition created challenges for Japanese companies that found change difficult or slow to achieve (Farrell, 2008; Fitzgerald, 2014).





Donzé takes a long-term, business history approach to analyze the declining international competitiveness of Seiko and the Japanese watch industry since 1990. He argues that Seiko found it difficult to adjust to the new character of global value chains, retaining the producer-driven strategy that had underpinned its earlier success, despite having lost its technological advantage. The overall industrial organisation moved to a buyer-driven global value chain, but Seiko failed to undertake the necessary changes in strategy and management in response to changes in international markets.

Lehmberg also offers a long-term view with his evaluation of the Japanese liquid crystal display industry. He argues that Japanese electronics firms have been known for applying vertical integration strategies, consistent with Japanese managerial preferences, traditional relationships and institutions. Outside Japan, however, changes in the technological and competitive environment have brought increasing vertical specialization in the electronics industry. The picture he presents is a complex one: he uncovers evidence of Japanese electronics firms de-integrating and developing cooperative relationships in technology transfer and outsourcing with overseas firms, but conflicts between the retention of traditional methods and needed competitive responses made change a difficult process. Despite operating in the rising diversity of overseas operations, in its subsidiaries, and through alliances and contracted partners, the strength of well-entrenched Japanese business approaches made the strategic and organisational transformation partial.

The transfer of electronics production to lower cost locations, in developing economies, has been a pronounced feature of the global economy since the 1990s. Fitzgerald and Lai provide a case study of Omron’s subsidiary in China in order to explore the long-term evolution of a Japanese-owned subsidiary. They explore, first, the origins of the Omron Shanghai subsidiary and the parent company’s ability to transfer its capabilities and leading Japanese methods within a traditional parent-subsidiary relationship. Second, they look at Omron’s attempt to turn their Chinese subsidiary into a ‘global factory’, utilizing global, as opposed to Japanese, ‘best practice’, within, in principle, a more federative structure in which subsidiaries possess particular capabilities and exercise greater degrees of managerial autonomy. They additionally consider the implications of ownership – the shift from a joint venture to a wholly-owned subsidiary – for management control and capability transfer. With the important exception of employment matters, it is the strategic intent of the parent MNC that is determinant in both phases of Omron Shanghai’s development and there appears a continuation of established Japanese practices.

Hong and Snell similarly conducted a case study to explore the challenges encountered by the subsidiary of a Japanese MNC in localizing its capabilities in China. They draw on the concepts of knowledge boundaries and boundary crossing, they examine how power relations and politics between a Japanese MNC headquarters and a foreign subsidiary can potentially impede the transfer of capabilities to the host country. They identify too how the continued reluctance of Japanese MNCs to allow host country employees to cross pragmatic and cultural knowledge boundaries have slowed down the process of localizing capabilities, slowing organisational adaptation and improvisation.

Bassino, Dovis and van der Eng consider studies of the localization of Japanese practices and the role of expatriate management in that process, plus the lack of consensus over those studies. They investigate 13 Japanese MNC subsidiaries in Asia and conclude that levels of expatriation are weakly correlated to measures of host country risk. Expatriates have been seen as a means of retaining parent MNC coordination and control and obviating the risk of opportunistic behaviour with joint ventures or subsidiaries. Another view is that expatriates can be a resource for building subsidiary management and localizing decision-making in the long term. They argue that expatriation can help deal with host country risks, but that the factors specific to the MNC and the subsidiary (capital intensity, the ownership share of the parent firms and the age of the venture) generate varied outcomes in the attempts to maximize returns and align objectives.

Zhang evaluates Japanese MNC approaches to equity ownership in and control over subsidiaries and the relationship to strategic objectives. She utilizes ideas on cross-national distance, but adds participation in ‘insider networks’ within the business that can compensate for a sense of foreignness. Cross-national difference and ‘insider-ship’ vie with each other to determine the levels of equity ownership. Her research suggests the importance of companies taking into account multiple factors in the management of overseas subsidiaries in the achievement of strategic objectives. Cultural and administrative distances - plus economic, geographic, knowledge and connectedness distances - influence Japanese MNC ownership levels. The tacitness of cultural knowledge shapes insider-ship within networks to adjust negatively MNC ownership levels, improving local responsiveness; the codifiability of administrative knowledge within insider networks alleviates the influence of administrative distance on MNC ownership levels, improving internal consistency.

Varma, Awasthy. Narain and Nayyarm look at how effectively Japanese MNCs have competed in India, by assessing their capability in forging local alliances. It uses case studies of three joint ventures and considers the role of national and organisational culture in determining the nature of alliance management and creating diverse outcomes. The authors assess the capabilities of Japanese MNCs in alliance management. Success stories highlight mutual trust, communication, consensus in decision making, an understanding of cultural differences in culture and an overall adherence to the Japanese style of management. They infer that trust and relational capital are important instruments of collaboration. Failure results from cultural differences, lack of common vision and strategic goals and different perceptions about the industry dynamics, time horizons and risks.

Conclusion
The contributions to this volume offer a number of overlapping themes (whose implications will be discussed further in the conclusion). Several of them adopt a long-term or business history approach that can track how the international competitive landscape has changed for Japanese business in general or for specific industries and assess how effectively Japanese MNCs have responded since the peak of their success by the mid-1990s. Overall, the authors have looked at a number of significant changes in the nature of cross-border competition and identified topics of strategy and capability by which to assess the nature and extent of the response by Japanese MNCs. They have emphasized, furthermore, the frequently uneasy clash between established Japanese management practices (typically home-grown) and the new demands of global competition for MNCs. The contributors note the switch from production to buyer-driven global value chains; management responses to the growing incidence of cross-border vertical specialization; the emergence of global factory strategies and the role assumed by parent MNCs and their capabilities; and the rising incidence of strategic alliances and cooperative relationships, alongside their effective management. They evaluate, finally, which factors might affect the ability of Japanese MNCs to make competitive and organisational adjustments: parental MNC intent and capability in the cross-border transfer of management practices; degrees of host country risk; measures of institutional difference, and gaps in economic development between home and host nations; parent firm-subsidiary and subsidiary-subsidiary power relations and knowledge boundaries; and the evolution of insider networks that overcome institutional and cultural distances.Table 1: copy one sent after completion
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